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LEARNING FROM THE STORM: LESSONS FOR ILLINOIS
FOLLOWING CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE WITH
ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING
WILLIAM A. BORDERS*

INTRODUCTION

The transition of California's electric industry from a regulated
structure to a market-based environment can be likened to The
Perfect Storm, a popular book and motion picture about the
confluence of three powerful storms off the coast of Nova Scotia in

California's restructuring storm was not based on the
1991.'
convergence of meteorological conditions, but instead on a confluence of shortsighted market design, poor timing, and limited supply.
The storm lasted through the summer of 2000 and the spring of 2001,

leaving in its path three multibillion dollar utilities on the brink of
bankruptcy, state agencies scrambling to triage a state-wide energy

crisis before the electrical demands of the California summer and,
ultimately, a remarkable historical and educational milestone in the
annals of deregulation.

California was not the first state to open its electricity markets to
competition. 2 Nonetheless, with annual electricity expenditures4
approaching $23 billion 3 and the largest population in the country,

* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2002; M.S., Environmental Management,
Illinois Institute of Technology. The author wishes to thank Fred Bosselman, Frederick Cohen,
Laurie Earl, Christopher Leslie, Richard Mathias, Katie Papadinitriu, Eric Priest, Kate Siddon,
Eric Stach and Adrianne Zahner for their support and editing of previous drafts. All remaining
mistakes and omissions belong to the author alone.
1. SEBASTIAN JUNGER, THE PERFECr STORM (1999); THE PERFECT STORM (Warner
Bros. 2000). See E-mail from Kenneth Rose, Senior Institute Economist, National Regulatory
Research Institute, Ohio State University, to William Borders (Feb. 5, 2001, 11:05 CST) (on file
with author) (analogizing California's energy restructuring to The Perfect Storm).
2. New Hampshire was the first state to introduce electricity market restructuring.
RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN
THE AMERICAN UTILITY SYSTEM 1 (1999).

3. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330 (West Supp. 1997) as amended by stats. 1986, c. 854 (AB
1890, § 10).
4. See U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts: California, at http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last modified July 3, 2001).
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California's experience provides other states with a powerful example
of what to avoid before and during the move to a dynamic electricity
market.
The factors behind California's rocketing electricity price, from a
low of thirty-five dollars per megawatt hour ("MWh") in the spring of
2000 to a high of $1400 per MWh in December 2000, are many and
complex: the inability to build sufficient supply to meet rapidly
growing demand, unusually warm weather, high natural gas prices,
reduced electricity imports, transmission constraints, limited demand
response,5 and a lack of long-term contracting all contributed to tight
6
market conditions and upwardly spiraling prices.
Though replicating the convergence of so many factors would be
virtually impossible, the lessons learned from this crisis can help any
state in its restructuring efforts. As Illinois makes its comparably
slow transition to open electricity markets, it should evaluate its goals
and strategies for a new market structure in light of mistakes made by
other states. 7 Two obstacles that could create inefficient market
operation in Illinois are: (1) the impact of transmission constraints
and subsequent market power concerns, and (2) the need for
consumer demand response measures and education programs.
Part I of this Note gives a brief history of electricity regulation
and the move from monopoly to competition. Part II discusses the
structural components of California's and Illinois's electricity markets
since restructuring. Part III highlights some of the key developments
in California's recent energy troubles, and briefly considers how
expanded transmission and demand response measures may have
lessened the impact of the crisis. Part IV considers the unique
challenges for Illinois's electricity market and recommends new
federal and state transmission policy to complement heightened
demand response and consumer education programs.
The Note concludes that regulators should not protect customers
from market volatility, but instead should ensure that the market is
5. Demand response refers to conservation measures that allow the consumer to save
energy and money by tracking usage and cost of electricity at periods throughout the day. For a
detailed description and analysis see infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. "[T]he failure of people to take this [California electricity restructuring issue] seriously
and the public officials to really focus on this when they had the opportunity has brought us to
this point.... [T]here's collective amnesia on the part of a lot of folks that there were problems
last summer." Electric Policy Committee Meeting: The California Energy Crisis and Its
Relevance to Illinois: Hearings before the Illinois Commerce Commission 31 (Feb. 8, 2001)
[hereinafter Hearings, February8, 2001] (testimony of Jerry Keenan).
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able to send appropriate price signals and that customers have the
necessary means to respond to market price information. Once
provided with adequate transmission, pervasive demand response
technologies, and a heightened understanding of the structure of
electricity markets, consumers will have the tools necessary to
purchase electricity from diverse suppliers, react quickly to market
fluctuations, and stimulate a vibrant power market at both the
wholesale and retail levels.
I.

THE MOVE FROM MONOPOLY TO COMPETITION

The three primary components of electricity infrastructure systems-generation, transmission and distribution 8-are
being
redefined in the United States. The role of generation, transmission,
and distribution are becoming more dynamic and market-driven as
regulated electric monopolies shed their vertically integrated
structures and reinvent themselves for the competitive marketplace.
A.

Electricity:A Unique Commodity

Though other industries, like airlines and telecommunications,
have successfully made the transition from a regulated to market
environment, electricity has certain characteristics that make handling
it as a traditional commodity particularly challenging.
First,
electricity is very difficult and costly to store. This means that once
generated, electricity must be used immediately or lost to waste. Just
as an empty seat on a commercial airplane is pure waste once the
plane is in the air, electricity produced and not used is unrecoverable.9
Second, the physics of electricity, combined with the difficulty in
forecasting potential demand, make it critical that a surplus of power
runs through the nation's transmission lines at all times. A simple
break in power supply on one line can set off a chain of failures and
black out an entire region if not controlled.

8. Generation involves the production of electricity and can take any number of forms
using mechanical or solid state technology. Transmission involves the transportation of
electricity at a high voltage to distribution facilities. Once the electricity has reached its
destination, the voltage is reduced and the distribution process begins. Edison Elec. Inst., How
Does the System Work?, at http://www.eei.org/future/reliability/how.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2001).
9. See Severin Borenstein, The Trouble with Electricity Markets and California'sElectricity
Restructuring Disaster, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. (forthcoming Winter 2002) (manuscript at 5,
available at http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/-borenste (last visited Oct. 5, 2001)).
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Lastly, the cost of electricity does not generally fluctuate with demand.10 Though one of the common goals of electricity restructuring
is to develop a market with a strong correlation or "elasticity""
between electricity supply and demand, most electricity prices in the
United States are quite static, or inelastic.,2 Consumers typically pay

a flat rate for electricity and therefore do not have an idea of the true
cost of producing that power. Without price signals between supply
and demand, operators of transmission and generation systems are

forced to provide a significant amount of excess capacity "just in
case." Further, electricity's integral role in our society creates a level

of reliance unlike the reliance on airline or telephone service, for
example. We do not call our congressperson when there is not a
discount seat on a Friday afternoon flight, 3 or when we get a busy

signal. But when it comes to electric power, a "busy signal" takes the
form of a blackout. 14 Therein lies the challenge of exposing electric
power, a vital community asset, to the forces of the marketplace.
B. FederalLegislative Development
The move to open electricity markets continues to be a gradual
process. Over three decades, Congress has set the stage for today's

nationwide restructuring movement.

This Section discusses the

10. Most consumers in the United States still pay a fixed price for electricity that has no
relation to the amount of electricity actually used. In fact, the price for that electricity is
typically determined months before any consumption occurs. Eric Hirst, Price-Responsive
Retail Demand: Key to Competitive Electricity Markets, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 1, 2001, at 34.
11. "Elasticity is the ratio of the relative change in a dependent variable to the relative
change in an independent variable."
Donald Watson, Elasticity, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS 329 (Douglas Greenwald ed., 1982). Used here, elasticity refers to a customer's
flexibility in seeking alternative suppliers from which to purchase wholesale electricity. If the
consumer needs to make the purchase and the market has few suppliers then the customer has
limited choice. Without flexibility in price, the demand is inelastic. JAMES B. BUSHNELL &
FRANK A. WOLAK, REGULATION AND THE LEVERAGE OF LOCAL MARKET POWER IN THE
CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY MARKET 3 (Program on Workable Energy Regulation, Working
Paper No. PWP-070, 1999), availableat http://www.ucei.berkeley.edu/ ucei/PDF/pwp070.pdf.
12. One of the common gains expected to come from restructuring is an overall reduction
in wholesale price by exposing consumers to the volatility of the market. If a person
experiences high prices for electricity during peak periods then that person is likely to use less
electricity during that period. Decreased electricity use during peak periods allows the
generator to incur fewer expenses and therefore charge less for the electricity used. Hearings,
February8, 2001, supra note 7, at 53 (testimony of Charles Stalon).
13. Borenstein, supra note 9, at 5.
14. Prepared Testimony for the Oversight Hearing: California's Electricity Crisis and
Implicationsfor the West, Before the S. Comm. on Energy and NaturalRes. 3 (January 31, 2001)
[hereinafter CERA Senate hearing] (testimony by Laurence J. Makovich, Senior Director,
Cambridge Energy Research Associates).

20011

LEARNING FROM THE STORM

relevant federal legislative provisions, their original intent, and how

each helped further the progress of electricity restructuring.
1. Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA)

The electric utility industry, historically staid in its design and operation, was first given a taste of competitive markets in 1978, with
the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act ("PURPA"). 5
Drafted in the wake of the 1973 oil embargo, 16 PURPA was designed

to help minimize high energy prices, economic stagnation, and
dependence on the foreign suppliers of petroleum that had dominated domestic energy concerns in the early 1970s.17 The act sought
to promote domestic energy self-sufficiency and outlined requirements for energy conservation and efficiency.18
Though designed to stimulate the use of efficient and nontradi-

tional power production within the regulated market system, three of
PURPA's provisions helped prepare the United States for electricity
competition.19 First, PURPA encouraged the development of small

power production plants and cogeneration 0 by requiring utilities to
purchase power produced by small generators or qualifying facilities
("QFs") 21 and to pay them an "avoided cost ' 22 for that power. To
encourage entry into the supply market, PURPA did not require
most QFs to submit to the traditional ratemaking 3 process or to
15. Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
16. The members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed
the embargo for five months in response to Western nations' support of Israel in the October
1973 war. HIRSH, supra note 2.
17. Richard F. Hirsh, The Spur to Competition and Utility Restructuring, ELEC. J., Aug.
1999, at 2.
18. Id.
19. HIRSH, supra note 2, at 71.
20. Cogeneration is the use of waste heat energy, both to heat adjoining buildings and run
turbines to generate electric power. Edison Elec. Inst., Fuel Diversity, at http://www.eei.org/
future/fueldiversity/fuels.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
21. A qualifying facility is a small power producer or cogenerator that qualifies under
PURPA to provide electricity to regulated utilities that are required to purchase that power at a
state-approved price. Such generators include power producers that use renewable and
alternative energy resources such as hydropower, wind, solar, geothermal energy, biomass,
municipal solid waste, or landfill gas to generate power. Energy Info. Admin., Glossary, at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/glossary/glossary-qr.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2001).
22. Avoided cost is the incremental cost a utility would incur to produce power itself
equivalent to an amount of power purchased from cogenerators or small power producers.
Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comn'rs, Glossary of Regulatory Terms, at http://www.
naruc.org/resources/glossary.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2001).
23. Under the traditional relationship, utility rates to customers are determined by way of a
rate-making process overseen by a state's Public Utility Commission. These regulatory agencies
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federal and state regulations required for larger producers.24 Utilities
entered into long-term, fixed contracts with the QFs to hedge against
an expected increase in electricity costs. These contract prices held
for decades, and, to the disappointment of utilities, proved to be
much higher than the steady decrease in energy costs that followed
PURPA's enactment. Ultimately, the QF contracts would serve as a
primary rallying point for the utilities' sponsorship of restructuring
legislation.25
Second, PURPA amended the Federal Power Act to require
utilities to allow the transmission of power from other generators
across their transmission and distribution lines. 26 Overseen by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), the mandate for
wholesale interstate transportation of power would prove to be a
significant step in the long road toward electric market competition.
This "open access" provision signaled the potential for markets to
move from a regional distribution structure to an electricity market
run on a nationwide grid. 27
Lastly, PURPA incorporated progressive "load management"
techniques that supported the implementation of "any technique...
to reduce the maximum kilowatt demand on the electric utility. '2
More commonly known as demand-side management or demand
responsiveness, these techniques found their first federal validation in
PURPA and continue to be a key factor in regulatory policymaking
and market activity today.
2.

Energy Policy Act of 1992

Wholesale electric competition was given additional support
through the Energy Policy Act of 1992 ("EPAct").29 The Act was
intended to spur the domestic production of energy and encourage its
more efficient use with the goal of lessening the country's dependence
use supply, demand, and operations data gathered from a previous year to gauge whether to
adjust utility rates. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
718 (2000).
24. Id.
25. Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, The Choice Between Markets and Central
Planningin Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1348 (1993).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 210 (1998).
27. "Grid" is a colloquial term for the electric system linking transmission lines both
regionally and locally. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Glossary of Terms, at http://www.caiso.com/
aboutus/glossary/index.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2001).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 115(c) (1998).
29. HIRSH, supra note 2, at 239.
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on foreign oil.30 Emphasizing the use of the free-market to achieve its
objectives, the EPAct allowed even independent electricity suppliers,
32
1
which did not qualify under the terms of PURPA, to sell electricity.

The EPAct
also expanded FERC's authority regarding wholesale
33
"wheeling

and permitted generators to deliver electricity to retail

customers.3 4

With these delivery mechanisms in place, industry
restructuring was easily within view.
3.

FERC Order No. 888

The final legislative push toward competition in the electricity
industry came by way of FERC Order No. 888, effective July 1996.31
Simply, FERC's goal was "to remove impediments to competition in
the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring more efficient,
lower-cost power to the Nation's electricity customers. 3 6 The order
requires public utilities that own, operate or control interstate

transmission facilities to file terms and conditions for providing
37
service to power suppliers transporting electricity across their wires.
In other words, the federal government gave its blessing for electricity
restructuring, but left the states to develop individual strategies for
implementation. Though initially challenged, the order was upheld,35

and has opened the way for restructuring legislation in twenty-five
states.

39

30. Id. at 240.
31. Independent power producers that were too large to fit within the exemptions of
PURPA were subject to Securities and Exchange Conmission reporting regulations imposed by
the Public Utilities Holding Company Act. The EPAct qualified these producers as exempt
wholesale generators. BOSSELMAN, supra note 23, at 732.
32. HIRSH, supra note 2, at 243.
33. Wheeling is the process of sending electricity from one utility to another wholesale
purchaser over the transmission lines of an intermediate utility. Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory
Utility Commissioners, supra note 22, at http://www.naruc.org/resources/w.html (last visited
Dec. 3,2001).
34. Hirsh, supra note 2, at 243.
35. 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, F.E.R.C. Order No. 888.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. F.E.R.C., No. 97-1715, 2000 WL 762706
(D.C. Cir. June 30, 2000).
39. See Energy Info. Admin., Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring Activity as of
August 2001, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg-str/regmap.html (last visited Sept.
4, 2001).
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II. RESTRUCTURING IN CALIFORNIA AND ILLINOIS
This Section provides an overview of the structural components
of California's and Illinois's restructuring efforts, including each
state's transmission and trading organizations, rate structure and
legislative restructuring acts.
A.

California'sRestructuring Components

The California state legislature began restructuring its electricity
market in 1996, when it passed Assembly Bill 1890, commonly known
as A.B. 1890. The intent of A.B. 1890 was to create a market
structure that "provides competitive, low cost and reliable electric
service. '40 From that point on, the once-monopolized state market
for electricity began a move toward competition. Consumers large
and small awaited the prospect of savings through competitive choice,
and through the kind of technological advancements in products and
services experienced in the deregulated telecommunications market.
Assembly Bill 1890 established two regulatory bodies: the Independent System Operator ("ISO") and the Power Exchange ("PX")
that would control the daily transmission and purchasing of power,
respectively. 41 It also provided strong financial incentives for the
divestment of generation within utilities that had previously been
vertically integrated.42 So while utilities retained a stake in the
transmission and distribution business, regulated by FERC and the
California Public Utilities Commission, respectively, the generation
side of the utility's business was fully deregulated and subject to
market forces.
1.

The Independent System Operator

The California Independent System Operator ("ISO") is a
nonprofit corporation created under A.B. 1890 to serve as a traffic
control center for California's long-distance, high-voltage power
lines. 43 The primary purpose of the ISO is to ensure the reliable and
safe delivery of electricity while guaranteeing that all generators,
40. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330 (West Supp. 1997) as amended by stats. 1986, c. 854 (AB
1890, § 1(a)).
41. Id. § 1(c).
42. Id. § 390(c).
43. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.caiso.com/
aboutus/infokit/FAQ.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2001).
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utilities, and marketers have the opportunity to deliver electricity
over the state's electric power grid. 4 The ISO's management of the
electric grid includes managing day- and hour-ahead schedules,
performing real-time balancing4" of load and generation, settling realtime imbalances, 46 maintaining scheduled interchanges with other
control areas, administering congestion management protocols,
system, and ensuring
maintaining the frequency of the electric power
47
that sufficient levels of power are generated.
2.

The Power Exchange

The California Power Exchange 48 was a nonprofit corporation
that oversaw the operation of the California electricity market and
ensured that all participants had equal access to sell and purchase
within that arena. 49 Overseen by FERC, the now defunct PX

facilitated transactions within the new market by determining the
price of electricity in day-ahead ° and hour-ahead5' markets according
to the demand and supply bids of the PX market participants.12 Based

on bids for generation and demand, the PX set a market-clearing
price at which all the bids for the day were bought and sold. 3
Assembly Bill 1890 required the three largest vertically integrated

44. Id.
45. Real-time balancing requires that the ISO operator make adjustments to ensure that
the amount of electricity being consumed within a certain area is equal to, or "balances" with,
the amount of electricity being supplied to that area. RICHARD MATHIAS, ILL. COMMERCE
COMM'N, REPORT OF CHAIRMAN'S ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS RE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ELECTRIC SERVICE CUSTOMER CHOICE AND RATE RELIEF LAW OF 1997, at 22 (2000).
46. If an electricity supplier schedules more or less than is consumed in a particular area,
then the supplier is charged for the difference, or "imbalance," and the costs are settled between
the ISO and the supplier according to the utilities transmission tariff provisions. Id.
47. California Indep. Sys. Operator, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.caiso.com/
aboutus/infokit/FAQ.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
48. The California Power Exchange suspended all trading on January 30, 2001 in
compliance with an order from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission eliminating the
requirement that utilities purchase their power needs through the PX. The nonprofit PX filed
for Chapter 11 protection on March 9, 2001. See Energy Info. Admin., Status of State Electric
Industry RestructuringActivity as of September 2001, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/
chg.str/tab5rev.html#CA (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
49. Id.
50. The day-ahead market is a forward market for the supply of electrical power at least
twenty-four hours before delivery to buyers and end-use customers. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator,
supra note 27.
51. The hour-ahead market is an electric power futures market established one hour before
delivery to end-use customers. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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utilities to divest of a significant portion of their generation business
54
and to buy and sell all their electricity through the PX.
The required-purchase mandate was intended to provide market
stability to the burgeoning PX. Ultimately, however, the requirement
that utilities purchase all their power in the PX's short-term market
left utilities at the mercy of electricity suppliers who could set

virtually limitless prices.5 The California ISO claims that generators
used their knowledge of the utilities' electricity needs to manipulate
the market by withholding supply from the day-ahead market,
knowing that any shortage would have to be filled in the next day's
5 6
volatile and lucrative spot market.
Hoping to stabilize California's turbulent power market, FERC

ordered market reform in the state on December 15, 2000.17 The
order encouraged utilities to enter into long-term contracts for
electricity and eliminated the requirement that California's three
investor-owned utilities purchase all 40,000 MW of their power needs

on the wholesale spot market.58 Trade volume in the PX quickly
diminished, and the PX shut down its operations on January 30,
2001. 59 The failure of the PX was a matter of market structure: the
transparency that allowed the PX to provide power at equal cost to
large and small buyers alike was the very component that allowed
6
sellers to know the maximum price they could exact from a sale. 0
This factor, coupled with a limited electricity supply, assured that
power purchases would always be near the market's cap.

54. These three are: Pacific Gas & Electric, Southern California Edison, and San Diego
Gas and Electric.
55. "If you are a distribution company and you are required to satisfy the demands of your
customers, and your customers are buying according to the established price, then it makes no
difference what the market price is. You have to buy to satisfy that [demand], which means the
bidding process, into the Power Exchange, the demand curves that were presented were
perfectly vertical, no demand elasticity.... Something an economist can't imagine happening
but in California they engineered it to happen, and it did." Hearings,February 8, 2001, supra
note 7, at 49 (testimony of Charles Stalon).
56. Tim Reiterman & Nancy Rivera Brooks, Energy Overcharge of $5.5 Billion Is Alleged,
L.A. TIMES, March 22, 2001, at Al.
57. F.E.R.C. Docket No. ELO0-95 (Dec. 15,2000).
58. Id.; FERC Issues Final Order on California's Market Problems: Response is Mixed,
FOSTER ELEC. REP., December 27, 2000, at 2.
59. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, Power Central,at http://www.caiso.com/PowerCentral/ (last
visited Oct. 5, 2001).
60. CaliforniaPX Preparesto End Operations,FOSTER ELEC. REP., January 31, 2000, at 7.
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3.

California Rate Structure

California's restructuring legislation, A.B. 1890, was designed to
allowing
give consumers choice within the electricity market while
61
utilities to recoup capital investments or "stranded costs.
To assist utilities in recouping their costs, A.B. 1890 froze retail
electricity rates. 62 The freeze was intended to allow utilities to garner
the difference between the frozen rate they collect and their actual
costs as a means of paying down stranded asset debt.63 There are6

several components to the frozen rate: a generation charge, 4
transmission and distribution charges, 65 "customer charges, '66 and the
Competitive Transition Charge 67 ("CTC"). When the cost of

purchasing electricity (generation cost) is low, utilities have no
trouble collecting their CTC and paying off debt. However, if the
markets have established a higher than expected cost, as in the last
half of 2000 and early 2001, then the utility is stripped of its ability to

collect the CTC. In other words, if the price of electricity is higher
than the frozen price, the utility is not permitted to charge its
61. Stranded costs are capital costs assumed by a utility for the development of
infrastructure while regulated that, because of risk, political or other reasons are not be easily
recouped within a market environment. BOSSELMAN, supra note 23, at 798.
62. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330 (West Supp. 1997) as amended by stats. 1986, c. 854 (AB
1890, § 10).
63. Michael Kahn & Loretta Lynch, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, California's Electricity
Options and Challenges: Report to Governor Gray Davis 15 (2000), at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
published/report/GOV REPORT.htm#TopOfPage (last visited Oct. 28,2001).
64. The generation charge is a currently fixed price charged to customers for the purchase
of electricity. Of the four billing components, this is the one with the greatest potential for
volatility, rising and falling with the variables that typically influence electricity prices (i.e. fuel
costs, weather fluctuations, supply and demand). Kenneth Rose, Open Access Retail Models in
Electricity, Presentation at Camp NARUC 2000: NARUC Annual Regulatory Studies Program
(Aug. 7, 2000).
65. The transmission and distribution component of the current pricing structure not only
includes the costs of transporting electricity locally and regionally, but also includes the ancillary
costs of billing, metering, and maintenance of the electricity infrastructure system. The
transportation and distribution of electricity is often referred to as the "wires" business.
Though it continues to be regulated by FERC and the California Public Utilities Commission,
respectively, the billing and metering elements of the wires business are eventually expected to
be open to competition. Id.
66. The "customer charges" component of the frozen rate most directly reflects the policy
initiatives at the heart of electricity restructuring. Though the CTC may be included within this
component, typical charges include costs for programs in conservation and renewable energy,
low-income assistance, securitization and nuclear decommissioning. Id.
67. The CTC is a flat fee charged to every customer, aimed at recovering "stranded assets"
(the capital cost of investments in nuclear plants and some fossil fuel plants that have a lessappealing return on investment in a competitive market). This charge also compensates utilities
for decommissioning of nuclear plants and the costs of long-term contracts under the Public
Utility Regulatory Policy Act ("PURPA"). Id.
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customers the additional cost. The utility must take a loss and cannot
pass these added costs to its customers. In California, the consequences of multibillion dollar utilities operating at a significant loss,
for even a short period, proved dire.68 Compared with California's
rush to the starting line, the gradual pace of Illinois's restructuring
efforts coupled with its diverse rate structure should allow it to avoid
California's pricing problems.
B.

Illinois's Restructuring Components

The Illinois Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief
Law of 1997, commonly known as the Customer Choice Law,
initiated Illinois's entrance into the world of electric competition by
making several changes to Illinois's Public Utilities Act.69 In October
1999, large industrial and commercial customers were allowed to
choose their electric supplier.70 Between June and October 2000,
certain industrial and commercial customers of the state's largest
utility, Commonwealth Edison ("Edison"), were phased in for choice
of electric service., Edison has allowed industrial and commercial
customers to choose new suppliers and has entered long-term
contracts with customers who deem playing on an open market too
risky. Next, as of December 31, 2000, all nonresidential customers
were able to choose their electricity supplier. 2 Lastly, the introduction of residential choice, 73 the transition that affects the greatest
number of customers, will occur in May 2002. This gradual, overall
shift to full competition in Illinois is proposed to result in a less
traumatic transition with fewer economic casualties.
Unlike California, the Illinois legislature did not require utilities
to fully divest of their generating capacity, but instead required a
functional separation of electric generation entities from the
transmission and distribution ("T&D") divisions of companies.7 4 This
policy is intended to relieve a remaining T&D company of a
68. See infra Section III.
69. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-101 (2001).
70. Customers with an average electric demand of 4 MW or more or who own ten or more
sites that total at least 9.5 MW of demand are treated as large customers. ILL. COMMERCE
COMM'N,

A

CONSUMER'S

GUIDE TO ELECRIC

SERVICE RESTRUCTURING,

http://www.icc.state.il.us/icc/Consumer/plugin/guide.htm#Phased-in
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-111 (2001).
74. Id. at 119A(b).

available at

(last visited Sept. 14, 2001).
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temptation to discriminate against other generators in favor of its own
75
affiliate-suppliers when providing access to the power grid.
1.

Illinois's Rate Structure

The Customer Choice Law provides for several distinct rate
components to ensure a smooth transition to a competitive electricity
market. The legislation provides the following: immediate rate
reductions for customers, 76 a power purchase option ("PPO") for
commercial and industrial customers, 77 unbundling of generation and
delivery service tariffs, 78 cost-recovery transition charges, 79 and the
8
designation of an independent party to determine market value, 0
seasonal rates, peak and off-peak rates consistent with the Public
Utilities Act.81 Each of the rate components of the Customer Choice
75. Id. at 119A(a).
76. The Customer Choice Law required Illinois's two largest utilities to reduce rates to
residential customers by 15 percent as of August 1, 1998 and to reduce the rates of residential
customers by another 5 percent in 2002. Illinois's smaller, lower-cost utilities reduced their
customer rates by 2 to 5 percent and these rates may be reduced further in 2002 to a rate
comparable to an average regional residential rate. RICHARD MATHIAS, ILL. COMMERCE
COMM'N,

RESTRUCTURING

THE

ELECTRIC

INDUSTRY

IN

ILLINOIS

15

(2000),

at

http://www.icc.state.il.us/icc/inside/docs.asp#cm (last visited Oct. 28, 2001).
77. Commercial and industrial customers are allowed to participate in a power purchase
option in which the customer mitigates some risk of potential price fluctuation by agreeing to a
set annual price for the power it uses. The PPO is comprised of an established market value of
electricity, a transition charge, a delivery tariff and an administrative fee. Id.
78. The Customer Choice Law provision allows customers to contract with alternative
retail electric suppliers ("ARES") for the generation component of their electricity. For this
reason, utilities are required to "unbundle" or separate the rates for generation, transmission
and distribution that have historically been passed to customers in one "bundled" rate.
Nevertheless, a customer that contracts with an ARES for generation still pays the incumbent
utility for electricity delivery. Id.
79. One of the key concerns regarding electricity restructuring is the incumbent utilities'
ability to meet the financial obligations of pre-restructuring capital investments. These
investments, or "stranded assets," often refer to nuclear power plants or other investments,
whose high initial cost and long cost-recovery periods may cause significant financial burden for
utilities in a fully restructured electricity market. To address this problem, customers must pay
the incumbent utility a monthly transition charge, regardless of the generation supplier chosen.
In Illinois these transition charges may only be assessed until 2008 (2006 in the case of one
incumbent utility). Market value of electricity is a major component in the determination of the
transition charge. Id. at 10-11.
80. The Customer Choice Law calls for the market value of electricity in Illinois to be
determined as a function of a traded exchange index, similar to the Chicago Board of Trade
("CBOT"). 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-112(a) (2001). As trading in the index has not yet
reached a mature level, the Illinois Commerce Commission has appointed a neutral fact-finder
to calculate market value for electricity. The neutral fact-finder reviews contract summaries
submitted by electric utilities and alternative retail electric suppliers to determine the market
value. Id.
81. See PETER A. HOFFMAN, DELOrITE & TOUCHE, 2000 NEUTRAL FACT-FINDER'S
CALCULATION OF MARKET VALUES FOR ELECTRIC POWER AND ENERGY FOR THE STATE OF
ILLINOIS (2000).
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Law is intended to provide fair, reduced electric rates for customers
and adequate opportunity for utilities to recover capital expenditures
incurred prior to restructuring. 82
The Illinois legislature has proceeded toward a competitive
Such deliberate
electricity market at a relatively slow pace.
calculation, combined with long-term contracts and adequate

generating capacity, has thus far alleviated most concerns about a
potential market debacle in Illinois. Nonetheless, California has
valuable lessons to offer Illinois's legislature, utilities, and electricity

customers.
III. CRISIS IN CALIFORNIA
How did an early leader in national electricity restructuring veer
from the goal of lower energy prices and a streamlined regulatory
system into the turbulent waters of soaring prices, rolling blackouts,
market instability and an uncertain energy future? The following
Section examines the key elements that coalesced into California's
crisis and how expanded transmission and customer demand response
measures could have tempered the state's fall.
A.

What Happened?

California's troubled markets have silenced many of the initial
advocates of California restructuring. 83 Utilities' divestment of
generating facilities, 84 diminished electricity imports, 85 and the state's
82. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-114.
83. Senator Steve Peace, originally a chief architect of the 1996 restructuring bill, later
argued against the plan he had advocated and blamed the California Public Utilities
Commission for requiring utilities to spin-off their generation-making way for higher priced outof-state suppliers. California Remains the Focus of Federal and State Actions Designed to
Mitigate High Power Prices, FOSTER ELEC. REP., Sept. 6, 2000, at 2.
84. The commonly held belief during the initial debates regarding restructuring in
California was that once restructuring legislation passed, new, efficient generation plants would
be built. Hearings, February 8, 2001, supra note 7, at 35-36 (testimony of Charles Stalon).
Some new generators perceived the transition period, with its fixed costs, to be a potentially
risky and less profitable period. Furthermore, until 1998, some generators did not consider the
rules regarding the actual operation of the ISO and PX certain enough to justify entering the
market. Id. at 91 (testimony of Jerry Keenan). For this reason, many resolved to bring new
generation on-line only after the transition period was over, and when free-market forces would
control prices. Id. at 89.
85. Increased demand in neighboring states limited the amount of electricity that was
imported into California. "Utah and Nevada specifically have seen five, six, seven percent
demand growth on an annual basis." Hearings,February8, 2001, supra note 7, at 16 (testimony
of Jerry Keenan). The increase in hydropower in the years 1997 through 1999 had also created
a complacency that left California underpowered and ill-prepared when a decrease in
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mandate that electricity be bought and sold through the California
Power Exchange, left California with a decreased pool of power,
86
while facing an annual 2.3 percent increase in overall demand.
Further, strict siting requirements for new power plants created a
challenging environment in which to construct new generation
facilities. 8 Faced with customers' refusal or inability to reduce usage

during peak periods, combined with other factors such as particularly
warm weather, 88 high natural gas costs,8 9 and the mandated elimina-

tion of utilities' long-term contracting and hedging practices, 9°
California's restructured wholesale market became a seller's paradise
and a buyer's nightmare in the last months of 2000.91 Though the

92
primary cause of the crisis was insufficient wholesale generation

hydropower began in July 2000. In February 2001, resources for hydropower in the western US
were at 68 percent of their normal level; by comparison, during the previous five years, the
western hydropower resource ran a surplus of over 100 percent of necessary capacity. Id. at 70.
California's dependence on gas-fired generating makes it vulnerable to the fluctuating price of
natural gas. Forty-seven percent of installed capacity in the California-Mexico Power Area is
gas-fired generating units. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
2000-2009: THE RELIABILITY OF BULK ELECTRIC SYSTEMS IN NORTH AMERICA 76 (2000),
availableat http://www.nerc.com/-filez/rasreports.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
86. See RICHARD ROHRER ET AL., CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, CALIFORNIA ENERGY
DEMAND 2000-2010 (2000), at http://38.144.192.166/reports/reports_300.html (last visited Oct. 5,
2001).
87. Environmental restrictions can delay new generating facility openings by four to five
years. Hearings, February8, 2001, supra note 7, at 86 (testimony of Joel Newton).
88. The number of cooling degree days in the Pacific region increased by 13 percent in
2000. Edward N. Krapels, Was Gas to Blame?: Exploring the Cause of California'sHigh Prices,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 15, 2001, at 28.
89. High gas prices (between five and twenty-five dollars per million BTU) meant that
even for the most efficient gas-fired generating plants, the fuel cost component was between
fifty and two hundred fifty dollars per MWh. For inefficient gas-fired plants that were forced to
come on-line when electricity grew scarce, the fuel cost component was between one hundred
and five hundred dollars per MWh. Id.
90. The gas and power market spot price increases of 2000 could have had a minor effect
on the state if the utilities had engaged in routine hedging, creating a portfolio of fixed price
purchases and diverse forward contracts. Krapels, supra note 88, at 28.
91. In July of 2000, California utilities, the primary buyers of wholesale electricity, paid $4
billion more for electricity than they did in the summer of 1999. In December of 2000,
electricity prices rose to $1400 per MWh, more than twenty times the price the previous year.
Laura M. Holson, Government Acts to Calm California's Energy Market, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2000, at A14.
92. California has roughly one thousand generating facilities with approximately 55,500
MW of capacity. Seventy-five percent of the state's electricity is generated in-state. The
remaining are: 11 percent from the Pacific Northwest (80% hydropower / 20% coal) and 14
percent from the southwestern states (74% coal / 26% natural gas). Id.; RONALD WETHERALL,
CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, 1999 NET SYSTEM POWER CALCULATION 3 (2000), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
Between 1996 and 1999,
California's peak load grew by 5,522 MW; new generation during the same period amounted to
only 672 MW. Kahn & Lynch, supra note 63, at 33. Without new generation construction,
severe shortages will likely recur. Holson, supra note 91.
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coupled with high demand by retail consumers, the factors that sent
the market spiraling originated with political as well as structural
flaws.
California's restructuring legislation was designed to allow utilities to recover some of the billions of dollars of capital invested in
plants whose financial return appeared less certain in a competitive
market. The cost recovery for these stranded assets 93 was to take
place during a transition period in which retail customers' electricity
prices were frozen. The frozen price would include a competitive
transition charge ("CTC")-the difference between the retail price
cap and the sum of all power costs to the utility. 94 Because the sum
power costs to the utility were expected to be lower than the frozen
retail cost, utilities would be able to recover their investment. 95 When
the investment costs were recovered, the retail price cap would be
lifted. Consumers would then be exposed to the market and,
presumably, benefit from low wholesale prices.
The first utility to recover its investments and release its customers from the retail price cap was San Diego Gas and Electric. The
timing could not have been worse. Customers were exposed to the
fluctuations of the wholesale market at a point when generation
capacity was strained, natural gas prices were high and an unusually
warm summer was just beginning. During the week of June 14, 2000,
purchasers of electricity in California spent $1.2 billion on power,
three times more than they had during the same period in 1999.96 San
Diegans saw their June electricity bills double. 97 Panicked by the
soaring electricity prices, consumers called for government intervention.
In an effort to curb the financial casualties and appease a furious
constituency, regulators reestablished retail price caps and then
instituted caps on the purchase of wholesale power as well. 98 Utilities
were still required to buy from the PX and they were still required to
sell to their customers at fixed prices; the wholesale price caps,
93. See supra note 67.
94. CERA Senate Hearing,supra note 14, at 2.
95. Id.
96. Kahn & Lynch, supra note 63, at 3.
97. Id.
98. Reacting to the skyrocketing prices incurred by utilities over the summer in California,
local regulators implemented a progression of wholesale price caps: from seven hundred fifty to
five hundred dollars on July 1, 2000 and then again from five hundred to two hundred fifty
dollars on August 7, 2000. Rebecca Smith, Probe of California Power Prices Begins but New
Plants Aren't Seen as Solution, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2000, at A4.
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though providing some price stability, simply announced the highest
price utilities would pay. 99 Ultimately, the retail price cap meant that
utilities bought high and sold low, forced to absorb a substantial piece

of each transaction and unable to pass full costs on to their customers. 1°° Between the months of June and September 2000, Pacific Gas

& Electric and Southern California Edison each incurred debts
equivalent to half of their net worth. 101

Some have explained this dysfunction of the market simply as
"re-regulation." 102 While buyers (the utilities) were constrained by
fixed prices, the sellers (electricity generators) were free from state
regulation; as the utilities plunged toward bankruptcy, the companies
that generated and sold electricity made record profits. In a single

five-day period last June, for example, more than $1 billion was spent
on California electricity.103
Until the Power Exchange was dismantled by a FERC order in
December 2000,104 if an insufficient amount of electricity was bid to
meet the next day's demand, the Independent System Operator had
the authority (as the "buyer of last resort") to make electric
purchases on behalf of utilities and bill them later. 105 In such a tight
market and knowing that the ISO had to balance transmission flows
to keep the lights on, generators were able to set any price. One
commentator compared these negotiations to "buying house
insurance when your house is already on fire-you'll pay anything for
it."'1 6 Utilities, still required to serve their retail customers, quickly
accumulated an insurmountable debt -a liability that often amounted
17
to hundreds of millions of dollars a day. 0

99. In some cases utilities would pay a wholesale rate of twelve cents per kWh and receive
a retail rate of 6.5 cents retail for that same kWh under the frozen price; the same unit of
electricity cost the utility 2.5 cents one year earlier. CaliforniaRemains the Focus of Federaland
State Actions Designed to Mitigate High Power Prices, FOSTER ELEC. REP., Sept. 6, 2001, at 2.
100. Smith, supra note 98, at A4.
101. Id.
102. See Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell, Electricity Restructuring: Deregulation or
Reregulation?, REGULATION, Spring 2000, at 46.
103. Kahn & Lynch, supra note 63, at 3.
104. F.E.R.C. Docket Nos. ELOO-95-000, Order DirectingRemedies for CaliforniaWholesale
ElectricMarkets, 93 F.E.R.C § 61,294 (Dec. 15, 2000).
105. The ISO was initially expected to purchase no more than 5 percent of the market's
daily demand. On days of extreme supply shortfall, ISO purchasing climbed to almost 30
percent of the daily demand. Timothy Egan & Sam Howe Verhovek, How CaliforniaFell Prey
to Power Sellers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, § 1, at 28.
106. Id. (quoting Robert McCollough, a former utility executive and energy analyst).
107. Id.
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Faced with utilities on the verge of bankruptcy, almost three
weeks of near-blackout conditions from operating the state's
electricity grid at maximum capacity levels and independent power
generators withdrawing from the market for fear of breached
contracts with the state's three largest utilities, the federal government intervened.1 8
In December 2000 FERC eliminated the requirement that all
purchases be made through the state-run PX and encouraged utilities
to engage in long-term contracting. 10 9 As a presumed warning to
generators against potential price manipulation, the FERC's
December order included a stipulation that generators submit
detailed data anytime they sold electricity in California for more than
$150 per MWh." 0 At the same time, Governor Gray Davis invoked
emergency measures to bring more generation on-line in time for
summer 2001 and lobbied a reluctant state legislature to allocate $400
million toward energy-efficiency and conservation efforts."' The
state also began purchasing power on behalf of the struggling utilities
and entering into long-term contracts with generation companies in
the hope of avoiding scarcity-driven pricing in summer 2001.
By March 2001, one hundred ninety bills had been introduced in
the California Legislature designed to restore the state's utilities to
financial viability.112

Proposals aimed at retaining the utilities'

solvency included posting a $10 billion bond to help pay for power
and stabilize prices, and the state's purchase of Southern California
Edison's transmission lines for $2.76 billion."'
At the time of this writing, in August 2001, Governor Davis and
the ISO are asking FERC to order electricity suppliers" 4 to refund
$8.9 billion to California's utilities and taxpayers for market
manipulation."n
FERC, in turn, has announced a method for
108. FERC Issues Final Order on California'sMarket Problems: Response is Mixed, supra
note 58, at 2.
109. Id.
110. This price was considered to be a fair estimate of the highest cost a generator could
face in producing the electricity. Jeff Gerth & Joseph Kahn, Critics Say U.S. Energy Agency Is
Weak in Oversightof Utilities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at Al.
111. Laura M. Holson, California'sChoices All Look Painful,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at

Cl.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Named suppliers include Reliant Energy, Dynergy, Williams/AES, Duke Energy and
Mirant. Id.
115. FERC Accepts ALl's Recommendations on California Refund Methodology and
Extends Refund Liability to Public Power, FOSTER ELEC. REP., Aug. 1, 2001, at 7.
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calculating "unjust and unreasonable" rates that is likely to result in a
comparatively small $4 billion in refunds." 6 Governor Davis has
demanded FERC change its order or face litigation., 7 While
remedies attempt to compensate for the mistakes of the past, it is
worth considering two long-term approaches that would have kept
California from stumbling into the competitive electricity market.
B.

Solutions for Tight Markets

In the search for solutions to the problems that led to California's electricity crisis, the need for more electricity generation is
clear." 8

Little discussion, however, has focused on the role that

transmission plays in ensuring the reliable transfer of electricity, and
on the role that demand-side management plays in allowing
customers to fully interact with, and react to, market signals. This
Section outlines the benefits of each of these approaches and

discusses how, in particular, they would have helped the California
market.
1. Expanded Transmission
Even with an influx of new generation, a state can experience
supply problems if power plants are completed and then unable to
run at full capacity because of a limited availability of transmission
The North American Electric Reliability Council
capacity. 19

("NERC")"° predicts that as states restructure their electricity

markets, transmission systems throughout the country will be faced
with increased congestion. 121 Incentives must be developed to
encourage investment in new transmission systems and resolve the

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. As of January 2001, California was about five thousand MW short of supply and state
siting and permitting requirements prevented the development of new generators to supply the
twelve hundred MW needed to keep demand and supply in balance. CERA Senate Hearing,
supra note 14.
119. For example, a 965 MW plant currently under construction by CalCon in San Diego
may be limited by transmission constraints to an output of only two hundred MW unless more
transmission capacity is built. Hearings,February8, 2001, supranote 7, at 85 (testimony of Joel
Newton).
120. Electric utilities formed the North American Electric Reliability Council in 1968 to
promote the reliability of the interconnected electric system in North America. See N. Am.
Elec. Reliability Council, About NERC, at http://www.nerc.com/about (last visited September
28, 2001).
121. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, supranote 85, at 5.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 77:333

problems involving transmission siting and development.'
Current
estimates predict that six thousand new miles of electricity transmission lines will be built in the United States by 2009, an expansion of 1
percent, as compared to forecasts of 20 to 30 percent increases in
electricity consumption during this same period. 123

The physical

transmission infrastructure is the platform that supports competition
in any region, regardless of how the electricity is produced. 124 Despite
the importance of infrastructure, building transmission capacity has
not been a priority for utilities in California.'2 s
In California, as in other locations around the United States,
transmission proposals face numerous hurdles in government
permitting, capital acquisition, and siting approval from local
communities. 2 6 Though the construction of new transmission lines
can be one-tenth the cost of building generation facilities,127 the social,
environmental and political hurdles to constructing new lines can be
significant.' 28 Further, planning agencies like the ISO acknowledge

"considerable uncertainty" in determining where to place future
transmission.2 9 As new generators enter the market, the points of
high electricity congestion shift to areas not anticipated by the
original constructors of the grid. 130

Nevertheless, the long-term

reliability of new and existing transmission systems depends on the
placement of these new generators. 3' Carefully matching generation
and transmission capacity helps ensure that transmission systems stay

122. Id.
123. John B. Howe, End the Gridlock: Why Transmission is Ripe for New Technology, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., Jan. 15, 2001, at 38.
124. Id.
125. See Peter Behr, Shortage of Power Lines Looms; U.S. Consumers Face Higher Prices,
WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al.
126. The California ISO estimates seven to nine years are required to permit and build
major transmission systems in California.
GRID PLANNING DEP'T, CAL. INDEP. SYS.
OPERATOR, 2000 OVERALL TRANSMISSION EXPANSION PLAN OF THE CALIFORNIA ISOCONTROLLED GRID 12 (2000).

127. See Brendan Kirby & Eric Hirst, Maintaining Transmission Adequacy in the Future,
ELEC. J., Nov. 1999, at 3.
128. The public usually sees transmission facilities as "large, intrusive installations
consuming broad swaths of forests, farmlands and suburbs [and] opponents of new lines
continue to cite health concerns related to the electromagnetic fields produced by alternating
current." Howe, supra note 123, at 38.
129. Id.
130. Typically, vertically integrated utilities built transmission lines taking into consideration
only the existing generation and anticipated load constraints. Utilities are unlikely to have
considered all the possible configurations of generator and load placement that ultimately result
from restructuring. See N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY COUNCIL, supra note 85.
131. Id. at 5.
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in balance and that overloads and outages, like those in California,
32
are less likely to occur.
As the California ISO prepared for the warm weather of summer
2001, it expedited eight transmission projects to be completed by
early summer. 3 3 The ISO issued a report in early 2001 that outlined
twenty-five transmission projects for Pacific Gas & Electric through
2005.134 Farther south, San Diego Gas & Electric was carrying such a
significant load that certain transmission and generator outages could
have required it to cut supply to its customers. 135 Nine transmission
projects were proposed to increase the capability of the utility to
import power and to mitigate the reliability problem that could have
36
otherwise occurred.1
Additionally, the ISO recommended the development of a mitigation project for Path 15, the primary north-south transmission
artery in California, which would allow more significant electricity
137
orders to be sent between northern and southern parts of the state.
The ISO wrote that "current congestion problems and reliability
impacts due to constraints on Path 15 are expected to continue into
the future." 38 Concerns about the reliability of a state's "central
nervous system," as transmission systems have been called, would
seem sufficient reason to spur investment for expansion. In a
restructured market, however, utilities have a more difficult task
justifying investment in regulated entities with low and long
investment returns, when compared to unregulated generation plants
139
with greater shareholder appeal.
In light of California's troubles, additional transmission is a
logical solution. Expanding transmission capacity throughout the
state would allow an infusion of more out-of-state generators to
participate in the California market. Ultimately, greater transmission
capacity within an electricity market allows more suppliers to
participate and gives consumers choice and control when making
decisions about power. Additionally, the implementation of demand
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Twenty-one of the projects are intended to address "emergency or thermal outages."
The remaining three projects will respond to the need for increased electricity imports into San
Francisco. Id.
135. Id. at 10.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 6.
138. Id.
139. Hearings,February8, 2001, supra note 7, at 85 (testimony of Joel Newton).
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response technologies provides choice and control by allowing
consumers to determine what they are willing to pay for electricity,
14
based on time-of-use.
2.

Demand Response for Consumers

California's growing economy, coupled with a delay in the construction of new generation facilities and transmission lines, will likely
result in a struggle to consistently meet demand for the next several
years.1 41 However, California can bolster its efforts to more
accurately control demand,' 42 and in doing so, reduce costs for all
those within its market. 143 The implementation of real-time pricing
("RTP") allows for immediate as well as future savings, and permits
144
consumers to intelligently reduce their use during supply shortages.
Real-time pricing is made possible through the installation of
meters that track usage and charge customers according to the
wholesale price for electricity at any given time. 45 One study
estimates that if RTP meters had been installed before the summer of
2000, California would have seen estimated load reductions of one
thousand to two thousand MW, price reductions during peak periods
of 6 to 19 percent, and overall cost savings ranging from $300 million
to $1.2 billion. 46 Further, the North American Electric Reliability
Council has found that reductions of demand during peak periods can
be as effective in ensuring the reliability of the electricity system as
the addition of new generation facilities. 147 Given the extended lead
times of generation, RTP meters appear to be a logical choice.
While the immediate installation of the ten million meters necessary to allow all California customers to participate in RTP may be
140. See SEVERIN BORENSTEIN, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING
REAL-TIME PRICING IN CALIFORNIA FOR SUMMER 2001, at 1, available at http://www.ucei.
berkeley.edu/ucei/Recent Presentations/recent_present.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2001) (web
page provides link to PDF document).
141. Kahn & Lynch, supra note 63, at 48; Hearings, February 8, 2001, supra note 7, at 19
(testimony of Jerry Keenan).
142. F.E.R.C. Docket Nos. ELOO-95-000, OrderDirectingRemedies for CaliforniaWholesale
Electric Markets, 93 F.E.R.C § 61,294 (Dec. 15, 2000).
143. Reducing demand at peak demand and price times can save wholesale expense on the
power that is not used and reduce the price of the power that is used.
144. BORENSTEIN, supra note 140; see generally Steven Braithwait & Ahmad Faruqui, The
Choice Not to Buy: Energy Savings and Policy Alternatives for Demand Response, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., Mar. 15, 2001, at 48.
145. BORENSTEIN, supra note 140, at 5-6.
146. Hirst, supra note 10, at 49.
147. Id. at 34.
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unrealistic, installing meters for large commercial and industrial
customers is a logical start.1 48 Such a program would require the
installation of approximately eighteen thousand meters at a cost of
around $30 million1 49 Though the cost is high, estimates hold that
such an investment could be repaid through electricity savings during
one to two weeks of summer temperatures. 50 Simply, the greatest
savings come from allowing individuals to balance their energy needs
with the market.
In February 2001, Governor Davis announced the allocation of
more than $4 million for investment in emergency efficiency and
demand management programs. 151 Included in these programs were
radio and television announcements aimed at getting residential
consumers accustomed to the idea of RTP. One such announcement
told consumers: "[I]f you knew that by doing a full load [of laundry]
after seven p.m., you could help avoid rolling blackouts, and make
sure school kids don't sit in the dark, and help keep your electric bills
52
down, you might just let that sock stay dirty a little while longer.'
Public announcements like this give a sense of how conservation
efforts may proceed in the future.
Of course, the most dramatic savings will come with the full
implementation of real-time pricing. However, given the current cost
of the meters153 and political resistance to allowing California
customers to feel the full brunt of wholesale prices, 54 a pervasive
implementation is unlikely to occur anytime soon. And while the
technology to respond instantly to market prices is not currently
available to all market players, the California Public Utilities
Commission and the ISO have offered pilot programs that allow
commercial and industrial customers to respond to prices by
curtailing demand. 155
148. BORENSTEIN, supra note 140, at 6.
149. Id.
150. Preventing a single day of rolling blackouts would pay for the investment in RTP
meters. It is estimated that one rolling blackout day costs each California citizen about one
dollar in electricity costs. Id. at 7.
151. See Press Release, Office of the Governor of California, Gov. Davis Outlines $800Million Energy Efficiency and Demand Reduction Program (February 1, 2001), available at
http://www.governor.ca.gov (last visited February 5, 2001).
152. Id.
153. The meters cost between two hundred and one thousand dollars per installation. This
figure does not count potential savings from the new meters such as reduced meter-reading
costs. BORENSTEIN, supra note 140, at 6.
154. See Holson, supra note 118.
155. The ISO has developed three new programs to compensate customers for reducing
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Real-time pricing allows customers to break from the static,
fixed-price model of electricity pricing, where price is determined
long before consumption occurs. 156 Instead, as active participants in a
competitive market, consumers can make energy choices knowing the
price they will pay. California paid dearly for not preparing its
customers for the volatility of the electricity market, and any state
entering into restructuring without RTP risks a similar fate.
IV.

COULD IT HAPPEN IN ILLINOIS?

While California struggles to resolve the initial economic and
political fallout from its move to competition, Illinois should take a
close look at the California experience and ask: "Could it happen

here?" Simply, replicating California's unfortunate combination of
structural, market-based and weather-related catalysts would be
difficult. However, the same results-high prices, disenfranchised
customers, and calls for re-regulation-could surface in the Illinois
market when rate caps are removed in 2005, fully exposing retail

customers to wholesale market forces.
This Section considers some of the challenges for the Illinois

electricity market, looking specifically to the effect transmission
constraints and limited customer choice could play in the development of competition in Illinois. This Section also recommends new
federal and state transmission policy as well as enhanced demand
response and consumer education programs.
A.

Transmission and Market Power Concerns

Consider a scenario of the Illinois electricity markets in 2005:

157
incumbent utilities have divested many of their generation facilities,

load when notified during peak periods. Id.
156. Hirst, supra note 10, at 34.
157. Unlike California, Illinois does not have a divestiture requirement that forces public
utilities wishing to recover stranded costs to divest nuclear and non-hydroelectric generating
facilities to an unaffiliated entity. Thus, Illinois utilities can
unlock the hidden value in their generating facilities by... simply
transfer[ring] ownership of their generating facilities to affiliated
companies.... Central Illinois Public Service has transferred its generation
facilities to an affiliate, Ameren Energy, and Illinois Power Company (I.P.)
transferred its generation facilities to a generation subsidiary of I.P's
Houston, Texas based parent, Dynegy Inc. These affiliates are free to sell
electricity to their affiliated utilities and to unrelated third parties at
market rates. In addition, ComEd sold its coal and gas fired generating
facilities to an unaffiliated entity, Mission Energy Mid West, which is an
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but still retain an ownership percentage great enough to exert power
in the wholesale market. The retail market, still dominated by the
incumbent utilities, faces volatility resulting from a lack of supply
participants and from the transfer of wholesale supply and fuel costs
directly to the retail consumer. Direct cost transfer and limited
competition create little incentive for the incumbent utilities to invest
in demand response measures to help customers make more informed
decisions about the cost of using electricity. The once heavily
regulated incumbents are trim utility distribution companies (known
as "UDCs" or "wires companies"),15 8 controlling the transmission and
distribution of power. Because having fewer transmission facilities
gives the incumbent utilities an opportunity to dominate specific
geographic markets with an affiliate-generator's power, the incentive
for UDCs to invest in new transmission facilities and, in turn, bring
generation competitors into the market, is low.
Imagine also that, though still bound by a statutory "duty to
serve,"' 15 9 the wires company is beholden to its unregulated generation
affiliates, the new profit centers of the once-integrated utility. With
no obligation to seek the lowest price for customers, the wires
company purchases power on the open market and any pricing
volatility is passed along to the retail consumer. Further, because of
past mergers with out-of-state utilities, 16° customers seeking remedies
from high local rates are forced to pursue relief across state lines,
from the home offices of conglomerate utilities. Local customer
service is now ancillary to national corporate shareholder satisfaction.
Such a scenario, though extreme, is possible. Illinois customers
should not have to experience the degree of vulnerability that
Californians experienced at the mercy of the volatile wholesale
affiliate of Southern California Edison. Also, I.P. sold its Clinton nuclear
generating facilities to Amergen, a joint venture of Exelon and British
Energy. Both ComEd and I.P. have power purchase agreements with their
respective buyers which gives each the right to purchase substantial
portions of the power produced by their divested facilities for several
years.
RICHARD MATHIAS,

ILL. COMMERCE COMM'N, CAN A CALIFORNIA ENERGY DEBACLE

OCCUR IN ILLINOIS? 1-2 (2001).
158. A UDC is a distribution wires business or a regulated retailer that serves end-use
customers. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator, supra note 27.
159. The modern concept of a utility's "duty to serve" can be traced to the Supreme Court's
ruling regarding whether Chicago grain elevators were devoted to public use. Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113 (1876). The Court determined that property is "clothed with a public interest when
used in a manner... of public consequence [that affects] the community at large." Id. at 126;
BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 148.
160. MATHIAS, supra note 157, at 1.
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electric market. To avoid a troubled 2005, the state legislature should
examine three primary features within Illinois's electricity market:
(1) the balance of power within the generation and transmission
market, (2) the capability of consumers to respond to market signals,
and (3) the depth of electricity restructuring education among the
state's businesses and citizens, the soon-to-be players in the electricity
market game.
Illinois must examine the potential problems unique to restructuring within its borders and pursue rulings at the state and federal
level to prevent entering the electricity marketplace unprepared. The
deliberately gradual pace of Illinois's restructuring law allows time for
safeguards to be developed that could ensure a smooth transition into
the open market. That measured speed will prove successful only if it
allows for the preparation of all participants, regardless of the market
knowledge or power they currently hold.
1. Examining Market Power in Illinois
One of the common misconceptions regarding generation facilities and the national move toward restructuring electricity markets is
that generators holding local or regional monopoly power prior to
restructuring are somehow stripped of that market power within the
restructured market.16 1 While competition may open markets to new
generators, limits in transmission capabilities and capacity can limit
competition to relatively small geographic areas, where a small
generating unit can wield market power. As a generator with market
power in an unregulated environment stands to gain considerable
profits, 162 it will only voluntarily divest its market share if the financial
benefits exceed the costs. 63
Ideally, competitors keep a generator's prices in check by using
available transmission capacity to compete for customers. The
availability of sufficient transmission capacity allows new suppliers to
gain entry into the market and forces incumbent generators to face
161. Bushnell & Wolak, supra note 11, at 3.
162. Borenstein and Bushnell explain that a generator with even a small market share can
drive up the price of electricity by withholding "a bit" of its supply, thereby boosting profits.
Borenstein & Bushnell, supra note 102, at 49. "[I]f firms of notable size are not exercising
market power, they are doing so out of the goodness of their heart and against the interest of
their shareholders." Id.
163. In a geographic area with limited transmission capacity, a small electricity generator
can exert significant market power because it knows that no other suppliers will be able to
consistently bring electricity to customers. Bushnell & Wolak, supra note 11, at 3.
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competition and lower prices. 164 Provided with a choice of suppliers,
the consumer should benefit from lower prices. However, utilities,
the companies with the greatest means to construct more capacity,
have a disincentive to build new transmission lines. 165 To do so draws
profits from their conglomerates' transmission and generation
operations, entities still affiliated as a result of the limited divestiture
provisions of Illinois's Consumer Choice and Rate Relief Law of
1997.
Illinois's restructuring law does not require incumbent utilities to
divest of all generating or transmission facilities.' 66 Unlike California, 167 in Illinois, many utilities retain control of transmission and
distribution systems and have simply transferred ownership of some
generating facilities to affiliated companies. 168 As a result, Illinois's
incumbent utilities now still own, either directly or through a holding
company, many of the generating facilities that they controlled under
The potential conflict arising from these
state regulation. 169
arrangements is clear. 170 If the wires division of a utility builds new
transmission lines into a geographic area controlled by an affiliategenerator, it opens the possibility that the affiliate may be pressured
by competition to lower its prices, and in turn, its profits. Thus, the
wires company has a vested interest in assisting its unregulated
generating facility to gain profits. In other words, transmission
companies that are affiliated with generators have a disincentive to
build additional transmission capacity. 7'

164. Id.
165. Behr, supra note 125, at Al.
166. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-119A(b) (2001).
167. The California Public Utilities Commission required all transmission operation be
turned over to the independently operated ISO. Fearing the exercise of generation market
power, the Commission required two of the three largest utilities to divest 50 percent of their
fossil fuel generating facilities. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330 (West Supp. 1997) as amended by
stats. 1986, c. 854 (AB 1890, § 10).
168. MATHIAS, supra note 157, at 1.
169. Id.
170. This practice is known as cross-subsidization and involves leveraging the regulated
division of a company to provide a competitive advantage for the unregulated division of the
company. See generally Jim Rossi, Universal Service in Competitive Electric Retail Power
Markets: Whither the Duty to Serve?, 21 ENERGY L.J. 27 (2000); Lawrence Sullivan, Elusive
Goals Under the Telecommunications Act: Preserving Long Distance Competition upon Baby
Bell Entry and Attaining Local Exchange Competition: We'll Not Preserve the One Unless We
Attain the Other, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 487, 518-27 (1996).
171. See James Bushnell, Transmission Rights and Market Power, ELEC. J., Oct. 1999, at 77.
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When such conditions occur in a fully restructured market, the
prospects for significant consumer savings are bleak.172 As summarized by Illinois Commerce Commissioner Terry Harvill, when
''consumers start shopping for the lowest rates from competing power
producers, the transmission squeeze could hamper competition.... If
you find that somebody in Wisconsin can sell you power cheaper, it
may turn out that because of transmission constraints, they may not
be able to get the power to you.' 1 73 Such a scenario contradicts a core
tenet of electricity restructuring--that the mobility of electricity
breeds competition.
In a market constrained by limited transmission, generators
retain market power. 174 Consumers feel this control most dramati-

cally during periods of high demand, when wholesale purchasers have
little option but to take what they can from a local generator.
Without concern for competition during these periods, generators can
expect an above-market payment.1 75 Within a fully restructured
market, the incumbent utility simply passes the wholesale price
directly on to the retail customer; utilities have little incentive to add
transmission. Commissioner Harvill summarized: "[M]onopolies do
absolutely nothing unless it is in their own best interest to do so, and
1 76
in this instance divestiture [of transmission facilities] clearly is not.'
As the electricity industry moves toward competition, utilities should
be given market incentives to expand transmission while local
agencies work to streamline the procedure for siting new facilities.
2.

Creating Competition Through Transmission

Resolving the problem of market power retained within an incumbent's generation and transmission structure is complex. Because
of the interstate nature of transmission lines, the jurisdiction for
oversight of interstate transmission is left to FERC, while siting and
other community concerns remain with the state's public utility
commission. Transmission issues in Illinois will need to be addressed,
172. MATHIAS, supra note 157, at 9.
173. Stevenson Swanson, Energy Squeeze Lurks in U.S.; Illinois Keeps Up, but Its Rate Cap
Expires in 2004, CH. TRIB., Feb. 4,2001, at C1.
174. Electric Policy Committee Meeting: The California Energy Crisis and Its Relevance to
Illinois, Hearings before the Illinois Commerce Commission 103 (Feb. 7, 2001) [hereinafter
Hearings,February 7, 2001] (testimony of Jerry Keenan).
175. Bushnell & Wolak, supra note 11, at 3.
176. Terry Harvill, Major Electricity Crisis Unlikely in Illinois, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 7,
2001,at 47.
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particularly with respect to Wisconsin.'77 Wisconsin is currently in a
distressed situation with limited electric supply, and Illinois, because
of its location and electricity supply, is the natural candidate to
provide the state with what it needs. 78 The political issues involved in
such an interaction are complicated.179 Successfully expanding
transmission capacity hinges on demonstrating transmission as a
productive economic investment decision while simultaneously
minimizing the social and political concerns that come with significant
regional projects. 18°
In response to stakeholder debates around the country about the
virtues of placing control of interstate transmission in the hands of
Independent System Operators like California's, as compared to
multistate Regional Transmission Organizations ("RTOs"), 1 ' FERC
issued Order No. 2000, requesting each utility that owns or operates
interstate transmission facilities to file a proposal on how it plans to
create or participate in an RTO. l 8
Experts believe that no single state transmission market is large
enough to sustain the efficiency and capacity necessary to establish a
competitive electricity marketplace. 183 By placing the control of all
transmission under one independent, managing body, RTOs should
help eliminate the market power of some utilities. 184 However, unless
177. Hearings,February8, 2001, supra note 7, at 101 (testimony of Jerry Keenan).
178. See WIS. PUB. SERV. COMM'N, REPORT TO THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE ON THE
REGIONAL ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION SYSTEM (1998), at http://www.psc.state.wi.us/writings/
papers/energy/elecrelltranssys.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2001) (web page provides link to report
in Microsoft Word document format).
179. "[T]hat's going to be a difficult role for the [Illinois Commerce] Commission to play
with the legislature because the legislature is unlikely to want to be giving leave for people to,
you know, dig up everyone's backyards here in the south suburbs of Chicago so the cheese
heads can have electricity." Hearings,February 8, 2001, supra note 7, at 101 (testimony of Jerry
Keenan).
180. See ERIC HIRST, EDISON ELEC. INST., EXPANDING U.S. TRANSMISSION CAPACITY
(2000), available at http://www.ehirst.com/publications.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2001) (web
page provides link to PDF document).
181. James Bushnell, Transmission Rights and Market Power, ELEC. J., Oct. 1999, at 1.
182. F.E.R.C., Docket No. RM99-2-000, (Dec. 20, 1999).
183. "California is big [as the most populous state], but it's not big enough [to create stable
electricity markets].... If we had a wheat market that were limited by state, we would have wild
fluctuations in the price of wheat in some states. What makes the price of wheat fairly stable is
arbitrage between markets." Hearings, February 8, 2001, supra note 7, at 61 (testimony of
Charles Stalon). Alternatives to RTOs include for-profit, independent transmission companies
("transcos") that own and operate their own lines, and not-for-profit, independent system
operators who operate and maintain transmission facilities owned by others. See F.E.R.C.,
Docket No. RM99-2-000, Comments, Paul L. Joskow, Aug. 16, 1999 [hereinafter Comments,
Paul L. Joskow].
184. HIRST, supra note 180.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol177:333

new transmission is built, the market power advantage remains for
85
generators in geographic areas with little competition. 1
The two primary barriers to the development of new transmission projects are (1) the difficulty in gaining local community and
governmental approval and (2) the lack of financial incentive to make
transmission investments. 186 As potential new transmission providers
struggle to attract investors and mollify opponents of an expanded
grid, they should be provided with new investment incentives and
siting efficiencies at both the federal and state level. 87
3.

Transmission Siting Challenges

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission does not have
strong eminent domain authority in siting transmission lines.I 88 As a
result, projects for new transmission can be quite complex, involving a
multitude of federal, state, and local agencies, and may take years to
construct. 8 9 Not surprisingly, local communities are often reluctant to

agree to interstate construction designed to benefit customers and
investors in states other than their own.' 9° Such community
resistance, coupled with the demands of multiple agencies and

government organizations, acts as a disincentive for transmission
advocates proposing future expansion.

As a means of expediting the siting process without losing sight
of community concerns, the Illinois state legislature should work with
the Illinois Commerce Commission to formalize a siting task force,
comprised of representative organizations and individuals, with the
authority to make decisions regarding the siting of new transmission.
Such a "one-stop-shop" approach would allow a single, intergovern185. Comments, Paul L. Joskow, supra note 183, at 12.
186. HIRST, supra note 180, at 15.
187. Id.
188. EDISON ELEC. INST., MAKING COMPETITION WORK 2 (2001).
189. One project, begun in 1996, to build a thirty-nine mile 230 kV line to link facilities in
Wisconsin and Minnesota crosses two states, involves an electric cooperative, has to cross a
river, and involves a state park. As a result, the reviewing agencies include the Public Service
Commission of Wisconsin, the Minnesota Environmental Quality Board, the Rural Utilities
Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, the National Park Service, and the various local
governments. A scaled down (161 kV) version of the project is now expected to begin
construction in 2003 or 2004. Id.
190. Utilities claim that a transmission line project between Minnesota and Wisconsin is
vital to increasing the reliability of transmission in the upper Midwest. Opponents of the plan
claim the project would simply bring cheap hydropower from Canada to the lower Midwest,
benefiting investors and consumers in states other than their own. Opponents also claim the
transmission lines would lower property values and electromagnetic fields emitted from the
lines could lead to adverse health impacts. HIRST, supra note 180, at 18.
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mental authority to determine whether the construction of a new
transmission line' 91 is in the best economic, social and political interest
of the state./92 The proposed siting board would streamline the
process of getting new transmission or generation built in Illinois by
eliminating the repetition and conflict inherent in presenting to
multiple agencies.1 93

4.

Transmission Investment Challenges

Potential investors in electricity transmission are often reluctant
to assume the risk inherent in such a capital-intensive, long-term, lowreturn, and publicly contentious investment.194 Add to that the initial
concern regarding the uncertainty of future regulation, and it is no
surprise to see utilities "like deer frozen in the headlights, waiting for
state and federal legislators and regulators to define the structure of
the industry in which they will operate, invest, and be regulated." 195

In particular, investors in transmission are highly influenced by what
the FERC will grant them as a return on equity ("ROE"), the base
factor in determining how quickly their investments will be amortized.
As an example of the uncertainty utilities face, a pending case
before FERC involves a California utility'9 that transferred its
transmission assets over to FERC control only to have the FERC
staff recommend a 2 percent reduction on the utility's return on
equity. 197 Frustrated by such experiences, utilities have appealed to
191. The same body could oversee new generation siting.
192. Ohio has such an intergovernmental entity. The Ohio Power Siting Board was
established by the Ohio legislature in 1981 as a separate entity within the Ohio Public Utilities
Commission. The Board issues certificates of environmental compatibility and public need for
the construction, operation, and maintenance of major utility facilities, including electric
generating plants and associated facilities designed for or capable of operation at fifty MW or
more, electric transmission lines and associated facilities of a design capacity greater than or
equal to 125 kV. Board membership is comprised of the Chairman of the Public Utilities
Commission, the directors of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health,
the Department of Development, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of
Natural Resources. A member of the public, specified as an engineer, is appointed to serve on
the Board by the Governor from a list of three nominees provided by the Ohio Consumers'
Counsel. Also included, as ex-officio members of the Board, are two members from each
Ohio Power Siting Board, General Provisions, at
House of the Ohio Legislature.
http://www.puc.state.oh.us/pubrel/opsb/opsbrules/opsbrules.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2001).
193. HearingsFebruary 7, 2001, supra note 174, at 37 (testimony of Howard Learner).
194. HIRST,supra note 180, at 19.
195. Id.
196. Pacific Gas & Electric.
197. The trial staff recommendation of a reduction from 12.5 percent to 9.8 percent is not
considered a final decision, but gives a good indication of how the FERC's final decision will
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the FERC, relying on cases like Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement
Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia,198 that highlight a
utility's need to attract investors by offering a fair ROE. The
Supreme Court in Bluefield stated that
[a] public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a
return on the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the
same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties.... The return should be
reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility, and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable
it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public
duties. 199
Responding to Supreme Court precedent and investor concern,
FERC should implement orders that provide transmission-controlling
entities, whether ISOs, RTOs or traditional utilities, with increased
rates of return on their transmission investment.2 °° The Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission should establish incentives, such as
performance-based rates ("PBRs"), to spur a transmission provider's
efficiency, reliability and customer service.2 1' Doing so will help
provide a "more robust transmission network and enhanced
operating capabilities than was the case during the era of vertically
integrated, regulated utilities." 2°2
Unless the federal and state governments develop new strategies
to increase construction of transmission capacity, allowing new
electricity suppliers to access Illinois customers, incumbent utilities
will ultimately have the final say in whether electricity competition
develops within the state. 2 3 Without transmission incentives, the cost
to consumers will be severe. 2°4 Further, as access to increased

come out. See F.E.R.C., T05 Docket No. ER01-66/000 (July 13, 2001).
198. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
199. Id. at 692-93.
200. Telephone Interview with Vito Stagliano, former Vice President for Transmission,
Commonwealth Edison Company (March 23, 2001). See also EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note
188, at 4.
201. Stagliano, supra note 200.
202. Comments, Paul L. Joskow, supra note 183, at iv.
203. Harvill, supra note 176, at 47.
204. Inadequate investment in transmission will "increase congestion costs, increase the
incidence of local market power problems, increase ancillary services costs, [and] increase the
frequency and magnitude of huge energy-price spikes." Comments, Paul L. Joskow, supra note
183, at 11.
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transmission capacity moves forward, a parallel effort to assist
consumers in gathering market information must be underway. For
even with additional transmission capacity, without the knowledge
and tools to interact in the marketplace, consumers will be left
behind.
B.

DemandResponse: New Incentivesfor a New Market

One of the critical elements in the development of a competitive
electricity market is the management of, and access to, real-time
market data. 05 Demand responsiveness is the ability of customers to
respond to real-time prices in the form of seasonal pricing, time-ofday pricing and lower prices for interruptible service. If a customer
has the opportunity to temporally react to peak prices by curbing
usage, the supply and capacity markets should more directly reflect
the true value of electricity.2 6 In a wholly or partially restricted
market, in which prices are controlled through a regulatory price
freeze, consumers are unable to react efficiently to price signals.207 In
such a market, customers are not exposed to the true cost of their
electricity consumption until their bill arrives in the mail.
1. The Customer's Choice
The central dilemma in determining whether to restructure
electricity markets is usually that customers must either accept the
prospect of retaining the high regional rates of the incumbent utility
or embrace the restructured market and expose themselves to the
cost-variability of electricity. Both paths require sacrifice. In a
restructured market, customers forgo fixed electricity prices and the
convenience of running a dishwasher or factory in the middle of the
day with predictable financial cost. Customers exchange this
convenience for the potential savings derived from leaving such high
consumption activities to off-peak periods.
Within the safety of a regulated market, customers do not have
an incentive to conserve. 208 Customers are generally shielded from
205. Black & Pierce, supra note 25, at 1348.
206. When customers in San Diego first experienced the volatility of the electricity market,
demand load in the San Diego basin decreased by 9 percent. Hearings,February 8, 2001, supra
note 7, at 81 (testimony of Joel Newton). See also Eric Hirst & Stan Hadley, Generation
Adequacy: Who Decides?, ELEC. J., Oct. 1999, at 8.
207. Id.
208. Braithwait & Faruqui, supra note 144, at 48.
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the fluctuations in the price of electricity throughout the day.2°9
Because most customers are billed based on their total usage during a
given month and a single monthly rate, there is little correlation
between the pattern of power consumption and the cost of the
electricity. 21° The prices customers pay to the utility are essentially
fixed and consumers have developed their electricity consumption
habits within this regulated environment.2 1 Once the market opens
and consumers are subject to variable, time-of-day electricity rates,
they may be shocked by the high cost of using electricity during peak
periods, and the benefits of conservation during those periods.212
When customers experience the costs and benefits of consuming
electricity during different times of the day, they have an incentive to
alter their consumption to correspond with periods of cheap power.213
If consumers choose not to alter consumption patterns, they will pay
higher rates for that convenience. 2 4 Ironically, however, within a
restructured market, utilities may have a disincentive to provide such
demand response information.
2.

The Utility Incentive

Both PURPA and the EPAct of 1992 contain provisions that
require utilities to offer demand management options to customers.
However, these acts are directed at traditional utilities, which
typically control generation as well as transmission and distribution
("T&D"). Because traditional utilities are vertically integrated, they
have a built-in financial incentive to induce customers to reduce
demand during peak hours. 215
In a restructured market, traditional utilities are bifurcated into
separate, but often affiliated, entities that control generation and
T&D separately. The generation affiliates are unregulated bodies
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 52.
212. See generally Energy-Efficient Supplies Going Fast, ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 4, 2001, at
http://www.enn.com/news/wire-stories/2001/02/02052001/ap-energy-41834.asp (last visited Oct.

5, 2001).
213. Hearings,February 8, 2001, supra note 7, at 30 (testimony of Jerry Keenan).
214. Id.
215. By reducing customers' demand at peak times, a utility can reduce the amount of
electricity that it needs to have available to satisfy potential customer demand. The ability to
reduce supply in turn reduces the operational costs required to generate or buy power.
Ultimately, significant reductions in customer demand can lead to a reduction in the number of
power plants that a utility needs to construct, saving the company considerable capital
expenditures. HIRST, supra note 180.
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and, like any business, are ultimately responsible only to their
shareholders.
With these new roles come different priorities for utilities.
Implementing demand response measures, arguably, is not one of
them. Incumbent utilities will become wires companies whose
function in the market is to transmit electricity to customers. With no
responsibility for power generation and the high costs associated with
operating power plants, these wires companies do not have the kind
of incentive to invest in demand response technologies that vertically
integrated utilities once did. During the transition to an open market,
UDCs focus on recovering stranded costs, increasing profit margins,
and retaining customers. Once engaged in an open market, the
UDCs' primary responsibility is to pass through wholesale market
charges to industrial, commercial, and residential retail customers
while ensuring the reliability of the T&D system.
Electricity Service Providers ("ESPs"), the primary competitors
to UDCs, face uncertainty as they consider the market's future and
their role in it; such uncertainty does not spur an initial confidence in
demand management investment. 216 As such, during this period of
uncertainty and price volatility, customers are left without true
market information and have little opportunity to react to market
shifts. Without market tools and knowledge, consumers are unlikely
to adequately seize potential savings or protect themselves financially
when electricity markets fully open.
3.

Demand Responsiveness in Illinois

Unlike California's restructuring bill, Illinois's Customer Choice
Law contains provisions that allow residential and nonresidential
customers to elect billing and real-time pricing experiments during
the mandatory transition period. 217 Despite this provision, the
number of participants is low. 218 Illinois electric industry representa216. The ESP acts as a financial intermediary between the electricity generator and the end
user. Using the regulated distribution system of a utility distribution company, the ESP buys
electricity wholesale and sells it retail to industrial, commercial, and residential customers. New
ESPs' main concerns are operational and start-up costs and incremental price battles with
incumbents. PAUL J. JOSLOW, WHY Do WE NEED ELECTRICITY RETAILERS? OR CAN YOU
GET IT CHEAPER WHOLESALE? 2 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. CEEPR, Working Paper No. WP-2001001, 2000), available at http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/workingpapers.htm (last visited Dec. 3,
2001) (web page provides link to PDF document).
217. 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-106-07 (2001).
218. As of April 30, 2000, one incumbent utility had served more than fifty-four hundred
nonresidential retail electric customers pursuant to the terms and conditions of pricing and
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tives see the need for continued participation in such programs as a
means of establishing greater price signals and transparency;2 19 many

have expressed concern regarding the low priority the state is giving
to consumer education programs concerning electricity restructur0
ing. 22
Illinois has spent $1.1 million on electric consumer choice education since passing the restructuring law in 1997.221 This relatively
small sum leaves the burden of establishing education programs on
local nonprofit organizations. One such group, the Community
Energy Cooperative, is funded by an incumbent utility, Commonwealth Edison. The organization is working with residential,
industrial, and commercial energy customers to help improve
distribution reliability 222 by changing behavior and energy use
patterns in communities. 223 With its $14.7 million investment in the
Cooperative, Commonwealth Edison hopes to help consumers reduce
electricity demand, save customers' money, and help reduce peak

loads that may threaten reliability in growth areas where demand
could eventually exceed supply. 224 Although programs like this should

prove successful in reducing some demand in specific local areas, the
Illinois legislature needs to adopt a restructuring plan that incorpo-

rates a statewide education program for its citizens.
4.

Bridging the Information Gap

Communicating with residential consumers can be more difficult

than with industrial or large commercial consumers. Because of the
billing experiments. MATHIAS, supra note 45, at 31.
219. Id. at 27.
220. Participants in the Illinois Commerce Commission Fall 2000 Roundtable noted that
other states have allocated substantially more funds than Illinois for electric consumer choice
education. Roughly three hundred thousand dollars was spent in Illinois in 1998 and 1999 for
the education campaign, "Plug-in Illinois: The Electric Choice Law," during the first year of
Customer Choice. This contrasts sharply with the first year spending of $89 million for
consumer education in California and between $80 and $90 million in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. While the Illinois fund has increased to $850,000 for the second year of the
consumer education campaign, this figure still falls short of the $73 million allocated for the
second year of consumer education in California. Id. at 41.
221. Id.
222. The incumbent utility, Commonwealth Edison, has experienced numerous reliability
problems due to the age and deferred maintenance of its electricity distribution system. See
generally THE LIBERTY CONSULTING GROUP, INVESTIGATION OF COMMONWEALTH EDISON'S
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS, at XIX-23 (2000).

223. Press Release, Commonwealth Edison Company, Commonwealth Edison Investing
$14.7 Million into New Venture (June 6, 2000), at http://www.ceco.com/news/comed/
display.asp?a=ComEd&recid=441 (last visited Oct. 5, 2001).
224. Id.
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large number of residential consumers, their wide distribution and the
relatively small size of their individual electricity usage, exacting a
significant savings per dollar invested can be difficult.225 Nevertheless,
by providing customers with the information they need through
educational campaigns and demand management feedback,
inadequacies in the information flow between supplier and consumer
are attacked directly.226 Such programs accelerate a customer's ability
to learn and to benefit from participation in the new energy
227
marketplace.
Creating an educated electricity consumer who can actively
participate in the restructured electricity market is one of the most
challenging aspects of moving from a regulated to a competitive
market. 228 For an industry that has never seen competition, the shift is
difficult enough. But for consumers who are familiar with the
concept of flat-rate electricity, any time, all the time, the suggestion
that consumption behavior will be reflected in a monthly electric
statement is not necessarily a cause for celebration. Solutions can be
hard to find.
A progressive utility in Washington State has begun educating
itself and its customers with a demand management program that
gives four hundred thousand residential customers meters to monitor
hourly electricity usage. 22 9 Although customers still currently receive
a flat monthly rate, included with their bill is a detailed account of
peak and off-peak consumption. Though the utility has commercial
customers on a real-time meter program, it believes that introducing
residential customers to the practice of tailoring a small portion of
electricity use to off-peak periods could pay off for parties on both
ends of the distribution line. 230 A simple concept-turning meters,
"the cash registers of a utility," into a "communication kiosk,"- may
231
be ahead of its time.
225. Black & Pierce, supra note 25, at 1364.
226. Hearings,February8, 2001, supra note 7, at 84 (testimony of Joel Newton).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Press Release, Puget Sound Electric, PSE Customers Practice "Next Generation" of
Energy Management: Puget Sound Energy Urges Shifting Power Use to Off-Peak Times to
Lower Demand (Jan. 8, 2001), at http://www.pse.com/pem/tday-pricing.html (last visited Sept.
30, 2001).
230. The company estimates that by getting its nine hundred twenty thousand customers to
shift just 10 percent of their peak-hour electricity use to off-peak times of day, it can free up
about 200 MW of power. Id.
231. Cinda Althoff, Smart Metering Provides Competitive Advantages to Energy Service
Providers, at http://www.utilitiesproject.com/documents.asp?dID=157 (last visited Dec. 1,
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Some economists have presumed that in the electricity market,
"like all other markets, demand responds to price.... When electric
rates rise, consumers consume less electricity and buy more energyefficient equipment. ' 232 However, as demonstrated in San Diego, that
economic assumption does not always hold true. 233 Consumers
without market information cannot respond to the market. San
Diego customers, unable to gain real-time information regarding
electricity prices, were blindsided by high electricity prices and could
only implement and quantify conservation measures after they had
received their electricity bill.234 Even then, customers did not have the
information necessary to know when, during the day, electricity was
most expensive.2 35 Therefore, customers interested in reducing their
electric bills had to reduce their total electricity use, rather than
reconsidering their energy use patterns. 236 Clearly, it is difficult to
change customers' electricity consumption behavior without access to
real-time information. 237
If ESPs and UDCs are allowed to pass the cost of electricity and
ancillary services directly to consumers, as they should in a competitive market, 238 then customers need the opportunity and tools to
respond quickly. A successful market transition requires that a
demand-side component to restructuring be in place before markets
open. 239 As demonstrated in California, a state runs a great risk in
extolling the market system when its citizens do not have the
information they need to become active market participants, and not
merely passive ones.
CONCLUSION

Without the implementation of new transmission access and
creative demand response programs, Illinois will perpetuate the
2000).
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Black & Pierce, supra note 25, at 1364.
Borenstein, supra note 9, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.

237. F.E.R.C., STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATION COMMISSION ON
WESTERN MARKETS AND THE CAUSES OF THE SUMMER 2000 PRICE ABNORMALITIES: PART 1,

at 6-13 (2000).
238. Any attempt to try to curb a demand response market is dangerous in that it will hurt
customers and hamper innovation. Hearings,February8, 2001, supra note 7, at 118 (testimony
of Joel Newton).
239. Hirst, supra note 10, at 34.
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monopoly advantage of incumbents and create underinformed
customers. Without the opportunity to participate actively in a fully
restructured market, customers will be unable to reap the benefits, or
mitigate the risks, inherent in the new competitive environment.
Expansion of transmission can be brought about through federally
ordered investment incentives and new, intergovernmental siting
agencies.
Adequate demand response measures require state
incentives and prolific education.
Models for perfect competition exist when both buyers and
sellers are armed with complete information about supply and
demand. 24°
Electricity markets must resolve the information
imbalance that currently exists among market participants. If market
competition is to exist, price cannot be subject to government
regulation or other artificial prohibitions that allow one participant to
241
gain an undue advantage over another.
Every state considering electricity restructuring will grapple with
the task of offering equal access to all market participants and
delivering accurate signals to all consumers; Illinois's chances of
success in adopting a competitive market system will improve with a
streamlined and representative regulatory scheme, informed market
participants, and dexterity in avoiding the unexpected squalls of
restructuring.

240. John P. Gould, Price Theory, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, supra note 11, at 759.
241. Id.

